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1. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, a school principal ordered the strip search of a thirteen-year-old
girl who he suspected had hidden prescription-strength ibuprofen in her day
planner a few days earlier.' Although no one had suggested she might be
concealing drugs in her clothing, the girl was forced to remove her clothes
and pull out her underwear so that the school nurse could look between her
breasts and around her pelvic area for pills.2 The search yielded nothing.3
Afterward, the teenager, an honor student, was forced to sit alone outside the
principal's office for two hours; her parents were not called.4 The girl's
mother sued the school officials for violating her daughter's Fourth Amend-
ment rights, and, after years of extensive litigation, the United States Supreme
1. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2638 (2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2645
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Court heard the case Safford Unified School District No. I v. Redding in
2009." The Court held that, although the principal may have violated the
girl's Fourth Amendment rights, he would not be held liable for his actions.
Unfortunately, this situation is not unique in the United States. Since
the Supreme Court's 1985 decision New Jersey v. TL.O., 7 courts have ana-
lyzed school searches, including strip searches, using a reduced Fourth
Amendment standard - reasonable suspicion - rather than probable cause, the
higher standard more typically employed in situations involving a search.
The T.L.O. Court found that, while students retain a legitimate expectation of
prvacv. schools have a countervailing interest in maintaining security and
order. Therefore, the T.L.O. Court diluted the Fourth Amendment probable
cause requirement in the school environment and crafted a two-prong reason-
ableness test to apply in school search situations. 9 First, the Court held that a
search of a student in school can be "'justified at its inception"' by reasonable
suspicion instead of probable cause.10 Second, the Court held that a search is
permissible as long as the measures adopted are "reasonably related to the
objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and
sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." 1
In T.L.O., a student's purse was searched, but lower courts later applied
the two-prong test to students who were strip searched by school officials.12
Because the policy behind the T.L.O. decision does not logically translate to
strip search cases, these lower courts, even within circuits, struggled to apply
the two-prong test and reached dichotomous conclusions in similar factual
situations.' 3 Because T.L.O. and its progeny were unclear, the law on strip
searching in schools became further muddled, and, as a result, courts held that
school officials were entitled to qualified immunity when they strip searched
students.14
Until 2009, the Supreme Court had not addressed the issue of strip
searches in schools, and Safford provided the Court with the perfect opportu-
nity to redress the strip search violations occurring across the country. The
5. Id. at 2638 (majority opinion).
6. Id. at 2644.
7. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). Prior to 1985, some courts held that school officials
acted in loco parentis in dealing with students and thus with absolute immunity as
surrogates of the parents. See, e.g., R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.
1983). T.L.O. made it clear that a school official is a person acting under color of
state law, stating that "school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely
as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim the parents' immunity from the
strictures of the Fourth Amendment." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-37.
8. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
9. Id. at 341.
10. Id. at 341-42 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.C.
11252010]
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parties, amici, and scholars predicted that the Supreme Court would clarify
the confusing two-part test and its application to strip searches in schools.' 5
Safford held that the school principal violated the student's Fourth Amend-
ment rights when he ordered the strip search but shielded the principal from
liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity because the law on the issue
was unclear.' 6 While the Court made some clarifications in the law, it created
more ambiguity than lucidity. As a result, the doctrine of qualified immunity
will continue to act as a shield, and students will remain subject to strip
searches within their schools.
This Article exposes the problems created by T.L.O. and its progeny,
analyzes the Safford decision, and proposes recommendations for lower
courts, legislatures, and local school boards to redress the current strip search
crisis in public schools. Part II explains the T.L.O. two-prong test and illu-
strates the problems the T.L.O. Court and lower courts have had in applying
it, specifically in strip search cases. Part III analyzes the Safford opinion and
its ramifications. Part IV proposes ways in which lower courts, legislatures,
and local school boards can redress the problems created by TL.O. and Saf
ford so that officials will no longer be protected when they violate their stu-
dents' Fourth Amendment rights. Part V concludes that without these
changes, schools will be unable to provide a safe learning environment for
their students.
II. STRIP SEARCHES IN SCHOOLS: NEWJERSEY V. T.L.O.
AND ITS PROGENY
A student who is strip searched in a public school can bring a civil ac-
tion claiming that officials violated a federal statutory or constitutional right
while acting under color of state law.' 7 In these actions, the student must
15. See, e.g., Chris Suedekum, Comment, Safford Unified School District No. I
v. Redding: Balancing Students' Rights Against the Government's Interest in Protect-
ing the Educational Process, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 427 (2009)
(discussing the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision and predicting possible outcomes of
the Supreme Court decision, pending at the time); Brief of Amici Curiae The Ruther-
ford Institute et al. in Support of Respondent at *4, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v.
Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479); Brief of Amici Curiae the National
School Boards Ass'n and American Ass'n of School Administrators in Support of
Petitioners at *2, Safford, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (No. 08-479); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at *30, Safford, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (No. 08-479);
Brief of Amici Curiae the National Ass'n of Social Workers and its Arizona Chapter
et al. in Support of Respondent April Redding at *3-4, Safford, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (No.
08-479).
16. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2644.
17. Parents, acting on behalf of their children, can bring civil claims against
public school officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), which provides:
1126 [Vol. 75
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apply the TL.O. two-part test to Frove the school official violated the stu-
dent's Fourth Amendment rights.' However, because the test and its under-
lying policies have created more ambiguities than clarifications for courts that
attempt to apply it, the doctrine of qualified immunity has been successfully
utilized as a defense to shield school officials from immunity. 19
Courts have interpreted the warrant and probable cause requirements of
the Fourth Amendment 20 to have only a few narrow, "well-delineated excep-
tions."21 The main issue raised in New Jersey v. T.L. 0. was whether searches
in schools merited an exception to the warrant and probable cause require-
22
ment. The T.L.O. Court held that students have a legitimate expectation of
privacy at school. However, it found that the expectation of privacy was li-
mited and that school officials were not required to obtain a warrant before
searching a student under their authority.23 In addition to finding an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement, the Court found that probable cause was not
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any cit-
izen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... "
Id. While § 1983 does not create a substantive right, it permits an injured person to
recover in federal court against people who violate a federal statutory or constitutional
right while acting under color of state law. Neuens v. City of Columbus, 303 F.3d
667, 670 (6th Cir. 2002).
18. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985).
19. See infra Part II.C.
20. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The United States Supreme
Court has enumerated such exceptions. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337
(1990) (protective sweep); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (per
curiam) (brief stop for traffic violations); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 884 (1975) (border searches); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969)
(search incident to arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (on-the-street stop
and frisk searches); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967) (routine
building code inspections).
22. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 332-33. Although T.L.O. examined the Fourth Amend-
ment in terms of the exclusionary rule in criminal cases, the reasoning applies in civil
suits as well. Id. at 335.
23. Id. at 340; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
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necessary, stating that the school setting requires "some modification of the
level of suspicion" normally required to justify a search.24 Citing Terry v.
Ohio,25 the Court reasoned that just as an on-the-street encounter requires less
than probable cause, a search at a school could also be justified on less than
probable cause where there is a determination of reasonableness based on a
26
careful balancing of governmental and private interests.26 Thus, in order to
prove a violation of the Fourth Amendment in a school setting, the T.L.O.
decision created a two-part test modeled after the Terry sto, and frisk
271P
search to determine the reasonableness of a search in schools. Under the
two-part test, courts consider "'whether the . . . action was justified at its in-
ception"' and whether the search conducted "'was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' 29
The Court used a reasonableness standard for both prongs of the test. In
defining "justified at its inception," the Court, similar to its rationale for a
stop in Terry, used a standard less than probable cause, stating, "[A] search . .
. will be 'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated
or is violating either the law or the rules of the school." 30 Likewise, the Court
used a reasonableness standard in defining scope, similar to the frisk standard
in Terry, stating that "a search will be permissible in its scope when the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and
not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction."31 In discussing the "nature of the infraction," the
Court noted that lower courts should defer to the judgment of the school offi-
cials and "refrain from attempting to distinguish between rules that are impor-
tant to the preservation of order in the schools and rules that are not."32
After enunciating the rule, the Court applied it to the situation in T.L. 0.,
where a teacher caught a fourteen-year-old freshman girl smoking in the
school bathroom.33 After the student denied she was smoking, the vice prin-
cipal demanded to see her purse.34 When he initially opened the purse, he
24. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
25. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
26. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
27. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20. Under limited circumstances, the stop and frisk
search allows a police officer "to conduct a carefully limited search" of a person when
the officer believes "criminal activity may be afoot." Id. at 30.
28. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
29. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
30. Id. at 341-42.
31. Id. at 342.
32. Id. at 342 n.9 ("We are unwilling to adopt a standard under which the legality
of a search is dependent upon a judge's evaluation of the relative importance of vari-
ous school rules.").
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found a pack of cigarettes and rolling papers. 35 He then thoroughly searched
the purse and found marijuana, a pipe, and other drug paraphernalia.36 The
Court, applying its newly crafted two-part test, found that the case actually
involved two searches - the first for cigarettes, which gave rise to the second,
the search for marijuana. 37 The Court found that the initial search of the
purse was justified at its inception because the vice principal had reasonable
grounds to believe the student had cigarettes in her purse when a teacher re-
ported she was smoking in the bathroom. When the vice principal found the
cigarettes in the student's purse, he also discovered rolling papers, which
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that she was carrying marijuana in her
purse. 39 The second, more extensive search of T.L.O.'s purse turned up evi-
dence implicating her in selling drugs.40 The Court found that the scope of
the search, including the search of a zippered pocket within the second
search, was justified under the circumstances.41 The Court did not address
the age or sex of the student or the nature of the infraction.
Justice Brennan, in his dissent in TL.O., predicted that the test crafted
for school searches would lead to "uncertainty" in the law and that school
officials would be "hopelessly adrift as to when a search may be permissi-
ble."42 Justice Brennan complained that the T.L.O. standard was a "Rohr-
schach-like [sic] test"43 and proposed maintaining probable cause as the ap-
propriate standard in all school searches." Justice Stevens, in a separate dis-
3 5. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 343-44.
38. Id. at 346-47.
39. Id. at 347.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 366 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Id. at 358. The Rorschach test, also known as the ink blot test, is a psycho-
logical test in which a respondent's perceptions of inkblots are analyzed in an effort to
diagnose any underlying thought disorders. See, e.g., The Original Rorschach Web-
site, http://www.rorschach.org/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2010).
44. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment's language compels - that school searches like that
conducted in this case are valid only if supported by probable cause.").
Today's decision sanctions school officials to conduct full-scale searches
on a "reasonableness" standard whose only definite content is that it is not
the same test as the "probable cause" standard found in the text of the
Fourth Amendment. In adopting this unclear, unprecedented, and unne-
cessary departure from generally applicable Fourth Amendment standards,
the Court carves out a broad exception to standards that this Court has de-
veloped over years of considering Fourth Amendment problems. Its deci-
sion is supported neither by precedent nor even by a fair application of the
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sent, specifically mentioned strip searches, declaring: "One thing is clear
under any standard - the shocking strip searches that are described in some
cases have no place in the schoolhouse."A5 Five years earlier, the Seventh
Circuit found that a strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl was a clear viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, stating that the search "exceeded the 'bounds
,,46
of reason' by two and a half country miles. However, since T.L.O., courts
have applied the two-prong test to the varied circumstances and issues that
arise in strip searches, resulting in dichotomous results and confusing
precedent.
A. Prong One: Justified at its Inception
The T.L.O. standard for "justified at its inception" created a number of
problems for lower courts. First, the Court left unclear whether a sliding
scale test should be applied where more suspicion is needed as the intrusion
becomes more invasive. Second, the Court refused to provide guidance in
cases where there was no individualized suspicion.
1. The Sliding Scale Approach
The T.L.O. Court was unclear as to whether a sliding scale approach
should be applied. This approach would require a school official to have
greater suspicion to perform a more intrusive search. Although the Court did
not explicitly mention a sliding scale approach, it held that the second, more
intrusive, search of T.L.O.'s purse was justified because the vice principal
found more inculpatory evidence - the rolling papers - during the first
search.47 Thus, the Court implied that the more intrusive search for marijuana
might not have been justified simply by the report that T.L.O. was smoking in
the bathroom. The court noted the "severe violation of subjective expecta-
tions of privacy" in a search of a child's person or a closed purse but refused
to address the intrusiveness of a locker search,48 suggesting that a sliding
45. Id. at 382 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91,
92-93 (7th Cir. 1980)).
46. Renfrow, 631 F.2d at 92-93.
47. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347.
48. Id. at 337-38. In footnote five, the Court refused to address the question of
whether a school child has a legitimate expectation of privacy in lockers, desks, or
other school property. Id. at 338 n.5 (comparing Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662,
670 (10th Cir. 1981) ("Inasmuch as the school had assumed joint control of the locker
it cannot be successfully maintained that the school did not have a right to inspect
it."); People v. Overton, 249 N.E.2d 366, 368 (N.Y. 1969) ("school administrators
have power to consent to search of a student's locker"); State v. Engerud, 463 A.2d
934, 943 (N.J. 1983) ("[T]he student had an expectation of privacy in the contents of
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scale test is appropriate where the level of expectation of privacy increases
with the intrusiveness of the search.
After T.L.O., most courts did not apply a sliding scale test to the "justi-
fied at inception" prong, but instead simply required reasonable suspicion, no
matter how intrusive a search.49 Thus, the suspicion needed for a search of a
purse was the same as the suspicion needed for a strip search. In fact, in
some cases, officials started with a search of a purse or backpack and moved
on to a more intrusive strip search when they found nothing during the less
intrusive search.50  However, three circuits interpreted T.L.O. to require a
sliding scale approach so that the suspicion required to justify a search in-
creased as the intrusiveness of the search increased.
The Seventh Circuit, in Cornfield v. Consolidated Hifh School District,
was the first court of appeals to apply a sliding scale test. In that case, two
male school officials, who believed a sixteen-year-old boy was "crotching
drugs," forced him to strip naked in a locked locker room for a visual inspec-
tion.53 After applying a sliding scale test, the court found the search was jus-
tified at its inception and went on to state that "[w]hat may constitute reason-
able suspicion for a search of a locker or even a pocket or pocketbook may
well fall short of reasonableness for a nude search." 54 The court specifically
relied on T.L.O. to explain the sliding scale test, stating, "A highly intrusive
search in response to a minor infraction would not comport with the sliding
scale advocated by the Supreme Court in T.L. O.
49. See, e.g., Brannum v. Overton County Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 495-96 (6th
Cir. 2008); Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 604 (6th Cir. 2005);
Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1166-67 (11th Cir. 2001); Wil-
liams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 1991); Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd.
of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 824 (11th Cir. 1997); H.Y. ex rel K.Y. v. Russell County Bd.
of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1183 (M.D. Ala. 2007); Watkins v. Millennium Sch.,
290 F. Supp. 2d 890, 898-99 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Konop v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp.
2d 1189, 1201 (D. S.D. 1998); Singleton v. Bd. of Educ., 894 F. Supp. 386, 390 (D.
Kan. 1995); Widener v. Frye, 809 F. Supp. 35, 38 (S.D. Ohio 1992); Cales v. Howell
Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 458 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
50. See, e.g., Williams, 936 F.2d at 883 (search of girls' lockers, purses, and
books produced no drugs, so the assistant principal forced one of the girls to empty
her pockets, remove her t-shirt, lower her jeans to her knees, remove her shoes and
socks, and, disputably, pull out the elastic of her undergarments).
51. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1087 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009); Phaneuf v.
Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 596-97 (2d Cir. 2006); Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist.
No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1320-21 (7th Cir. 1993).
52. 991 F.2d at 1321.
53. Id. at 1319.
54. Id. at 1321.
55. Id. at 1320. However, in 1995, a district court sitting in the Seventh Circuit
made no mention of the sliding scale test when it found a strip search of seventh-
grade girls for a missing four dollars and fifty cents to be unreasonable. Oliver v.
2010] 1131
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In the 2006 case of Phaneuf v. Fraikin, the Second Circuit also applied a
sliding scale test.56 Citing the Seventh Circuit, the court held that "Cornfield
correctly observed that 'as the intrusiveness of the search of a student intensi-
fies, so too does the standard of Fourth Amendment reasonableness."' 57 The
court held that the school official did not have reasonable suspicion "to justify
an intrusive, potentially degrading strip search" when the search was based
only upon the student's past disciplinary problems, her suspicious denial of
wrongdoin , the discovery of cigarettes in her purse, and a tip from a student
informant.5
The Ninth Circuit, in its en banc decision in Redding v. Safford Unified
School District No. 1, also applied a sliding scale test.59 Referencing T.L.O.,
Cornfield, and Phaneuf the court repeated the same language used in these
prior cases to hold that the strip search for prescription-strength ibuprofen
was not justified at its inception because, while reasonable suspicion may
have justified the initial search of the student's backpack and pockets, it was
unreasonable to proceed to a strip search.60 While the Ninth, Second, and
Seventh circuits applied this sliding scale version of the test, many courts did
not interpret TL.O. in the same manner.
2. Individualized Suspicion
In addition to not clarifying whether the 'justified at its inception' stan-
dard entailed a sliding scale test, the TL.O. Court also refused to address the
inevitable situation where searches are conducted in schools absent individua-
lized suspicion.61 In a footnote, the Court simply stated that it would not
decide the issue of individualized suspicion but noted that, while "'some
quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite,"' the Fourth
Amendment itself poses no such requirement. 62 "Because the search of
T.L.O.'s purse was based upon an individualized suspicion that she had vi-
olated school rules, we need not consider the circumstances that might justify
McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (court based its reasoning on act that
strip search was to recover "grand sum of four dollars and fifty cents").
56. 448 F.3d at 597.
57. Id. at 597 (citing Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321).
58. Id.
59. 531 F.3d 1071, 1087 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
60. Id. at 1083-84 (distinguishing from facts of T.L.O., where initial search of
purse led to rolling papers, which provided suspicion to search purse more thoroughly
for other contraband).
61. Individualized suspicion refers to a belief by a school official that a particular
individual has violated a law or school policy. Individualized suspicion can be con-
trasted with a general, nonspecific belief.
62. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985) (quoting United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976)).
1132 [Vol. 75
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school authorities in conducting searches unsupported by individualized sus-
picion."63
Because T.L.O. did not address the issue, courts applying the two-part
test to strip searches in schools struggled to apply an individualized suspicion
standard in cases where there was no individualized suspicion. In earlier
cases, courts referenced T.L.O. when struggling to analyze situations where
groups of students were strip searched. For example, in Oliver v. McClung,
all the girls of a seventh-grade class were strip searched in pairs in a locker
room for an allegedly missing four dollars and fifty cents." Citing Renfrow
and T.L. O., the court found that reasonableness in some circumstances did not
make strip searches reasonable in all circumstances. In Jenkins v. Tallade-
ga City Board ofEducation, eight-year-old girls were strip searched for seven
dollars missing from a teacher's purse even though there was no individua-
66lized suspicion that any of them had stolen the money. The Jenkins court
criticized T.L.O. for its vague language and application of the law but found
that the school officials could not be held liable. In Konop v. Northwestern
School District, eighth-grade girls were strip searched by their music teacher
as part of a general search for two hundred dollars.68 Here, the court stated
that "a strip search [was] not justified absent individualized suspicion unless
there [was] a legitimate safety concern," such as weapons.69 In Thomas v.
Clayton County Board of Education, a whole class of fifth graders was strip
searched for a missing twenty-six dollars.70 The trial court found that the
search was justified at its inception because the teacher had reason to believe
that the money was missing. However, the court, in contradiction to the
reasoning in Konop, stated that individualized suspicion is not always neces-
sary in a school setting.72 Clearly, these courts were confused about how to
interpret T.L.O. in cases without individualized suspicion.
In addition to applying the T.L.O. two-part test, lower courts relied on
two other recent Supreme Court cases, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n 73 and Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton'74 to analyze group-wide
63. Id. (citation omitted).
64. 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1210-11 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
65. Id. at 1218.
66. 115 F.3d 821, 827-28 (11th Cir. 1997).
67. Id. at 828.
68. 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1192, 1201 (D. S.D. 1998).
69. Id. at 1201 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
70. 94 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Thomas ex rel.
Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated and remanded, 536 U.S.
953 (2002).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1305. However, the court found that the teacher went beyond the per-
missible scope when she strip searched each fifth grader individually, "requiring each
student, in the presence of other students of the same sex, to partially undress." Id. at
1306.
73. 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
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strip searches of students where no individualized suspicion was present.75 In
Skinner, the Supreme Court permitted urine testing of railway workers with-
76
out individualized suspicion, and in Vernonia the Court permitted urine
testing of student athletes without individualized suspicion.77 In these cases,
the Supreme Court balanced the special government need (railway or school
safety in terms of drug use) with the individuals' specific privacy interest.
Applying this balancing test in 2003, a district court in the Sixth Circuit ad-
dressed a case with no individualized suspicion in Watkins v. Millennium
School.79 In Watkins, three third-grade girls were asked to pull out the waist-
bands of their pants so that the teacher could look for ten dollars that was
missing from her desk.80 The teacher then took one of the girls into a supply
closet and asked her again to pull out her pants. The teacher did not have
any individualized suspicion that any of the girls was responsible for the
theft.82 Applying the Skinner balancing test, the court found that a missing
ten dollars did not justify the intrusion absent individualized suspicion and
distinguished the case from other cases where students were suspected of
83drug use or possession of weapons.
74. 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
75. For a more in depth discussion of individualized suspicion, see Martin R.
Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an Individualized
Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in the Schools, 22 GA. L.
REV. 897 (1988); Jennifer K. Turner, A 'Capricious, Even Perverse Policy': Random,
Suspicionless Drug Testing Policies in High Schools and the Fourth Amendment, 72
Mo. L. REV. 931 (2007).
76. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
77. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
78. Id. at 661 ("It is a mistake, however, to think that the phrase 'compelling
state interest,' in the Fourth Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum quan-
tum of governmental concern . . . . Rather, the phrase describes an interest that ap-
pears important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors
that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of priva-
cy."); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633 ("We conclude that the compelling Government inter-
ests served by the FRA's regulations would be significantly hindered if railroads were
required to point to specific facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of impairment
before testing a given employee. In view of our conclusion that . .. the toxicological
testing contemplated by the regulations is not an undue infringement on the justifiable
expectations of privacy of covered employees, the Government's compelling interests
outweigh privacy interests.").
79. 290 F. Supp. 2d 890, 900 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
80. Id. at 894.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 900.
83. Id. at 900-01; see also Thomas v. Clayton County Bd. of Educ., 94 F. Supp.
2d 1290, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (applying Skinner balancing test, court found that
privacy interests of students who were strip searched outweighed school's interests in
theft of twenty-six dollars), aff'd sub nom. Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 261
F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated and remanded, 536 U.S. 953 (2002).
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As illustrated by these cases, in determining whether a strip search was
justified at its inception, lower courts have been unclear as to how to apply
the T.L.O. reasonable suspicion test. Specifically, courts are uncertain as to
whether a sliding scale test should be applied and how to approach cases with
no individualized suspicion.
B. Prong Two: Scope of the Search
In addressing the second prong of the test, the T.L.O. Court stated that
the scope of the search will be permissible "when the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intru-
sive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infrac-
tion."84 However, the Court provided little guidance in the areas of the age
and sex of the child, the nature of the infraction, and the location of the
search.
1. The Age and Sex of the Student
While the Court mentioned the fact that T.L.O. was a fourteen-year-old
freshman girl, it did not explain the relevance or significance of her age or
sex when applying the facts to the test. As a result, most of the lower courts
mimic the TL.O. decision by mentioning the student's age or sex but not
explaining wy the age or sex is significant in determining the permissibility
of the search.
Only two lower courts specifically addressed the significance of a stu-
dent's age. In Cornfield, two male school officials forced a sixteen-year-old
87boy to strip naked in a locked locker room. The court argued that despite
T.L.O.'s failure to elaborate on the implication of the child's age, whether the
fact that a child is seven or seventeen is relevant.88 The court focused on the
84. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
85. Id. at 328, 343-47.
86. See, e.g., Brannum v. Overton County Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489 (6th Cir.
2008); Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2005); Thomas ex
rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated and remanded, 536
U.S. 953 (2002); Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991); Jenkins v. Tal-
ladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997); H.Y. ex rel K.Y. v. Russell
County Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 2d. 1174 (M.D. Ala. 2007); Watkins, 290 F. Supp.
2d 890 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Singleton v. Bd. of Educ. USD 500, 894 F. Supp. 386 (D.
Kan. 1995); Widener v. Frye, 809 F. Supp. 35, 38 (S.D. Ohio 1992); Cales v. Howell
Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
87. Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1319 (7th Cir.
1993).
88. Id. at 1321 (citing CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT (Gary B. Melton et
al. eds., 1983); Gardner, supra note 75; GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY, How OLD IS ENOUGH? THE AGES OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
2010] 1135
13
Donahoe: Donahoe: Strip Searches of Students
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
age of criminal capacity and consent at common law, concluding that adoles-
cents are generally presumed to be as capable of criminal activity as adults
but that elementary school children are less likely to engage in criminal activ-
ity.89 In addition, adolescents are able to understand the issues involved in a
strip search, including whether to consent, whereas elementary school child-
ren would not have such an understanding.90 The court focused on ages sev-
en and fourteen as useful guideposts for determining the privacy interest
based on age, concluding that "the legitimate ex ectations of privacy that
students in school can claim are not monolithic." However, the Cornfield
court found that the search was reasonable in scope despite the student's ado-
lescent age (sixteen years old) because the strip search was the least intrusive
way to confirm or deny their suspicions.92
Another case that addressed the age factor is Konop v. Northwestern
School District.93 In Konop, the district court hearing the case, which in-
volved the strip search of eighth-grade girls, found that "a very young child
would suffer a lesser degree of trauma from a nude search than an older
child" because adolescents become very self-conscious of their bodies.94 As
a result, the embarrassment and humiliation brought on by a search increases
as children get older.9 5 The Konop court found the "school official[s] should
have known that strip searching [these] students without a reasonable basis to
believe they committed a crime violate(d] their rights."96 However, the
court's reasoning, rather than focusing on and developing the age factor, was
largely directed at reasonable suspicion and the fact that the officials were not
searching for guns or drugs instead of focusing on the reasonableness of the
students' ages.
Despite the fact that other strip search cases involved students ranging
from second grade to high school seniors, other lower courts did not address
age in their application of the two-part T.L. 0. test, nor is there any noticeable
pattern of courts permitting strip searches within a certain range of ages.
(1989); Steven F. Shatz et al., The Strip Search of Children and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. I (1991)).
89. Id. at 1321.
90. Id.; see also infra Part Ill.B.2.b.
91. Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321.
92. Id. at 1323.
93. 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. S.D. 1998).
94. Id. at 1197 (quoting Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321).
95. Id. (finding that strip search of eighth-grade girls without reasonable basis to
believe they committed the crime was a violation of their rights).
96. Id. at 1207.
97. Id. at 1198.
98. Compare Brannum v. Overton County Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 500 (6th Cir.
2008) (Fourth Amendment violation of middle school students), and Phaneuf v. Frai-
kin, 448 F.3d 591, 592 (2d Cir. 2006) (Fourth Amendment violation of high school
senior), and Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2005)
(Fourth Amendment violation of high school students), and Thomas ex rel. Thomas v.
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None of the courts discussed the relevancy of a student's gender. The
courts that did consider gender did so by considering not the sex of the stu-
dent searched, as mandated by T.L.O., but instead the sex of the school offi-
cial performing the actual strip search.99 These courts often held that the
search was reasonable, in part, because an official of the same sex performed
the search. 0 0 For example, the court in Singleton v. Board of Education
found a search reasonable in scope partly because the search of a male stu-
dent was conducted by two male officials and the student was not touched
inappropriately.' 0 Similarly, the court in Cornfield noted that a strip search
of a student by an official of the opposite sex would "obviously violate this
standard."l 02
2. The Nature of the Infraction
In addition to not giving guidance on how to apply the age of the stu-
dent, the TL.O. Court was unclear in its application of the language "nature
of the infraction." The initial alleged infraction in the T.L.O. case was smok-
ing cigarettes and the second alleged infraction was possessing marijuana and
drug paraphernalia.lo3 However, the Court did not address the significance of
these infractions in the scope prong of its test, except to note that the infe-
rence that T.L.O. was involved in marijuana trafficking was substantial
enough to justify the vice principal's second, more intrusive, search.' Jus-
tice Stevens, in his dissent, expressed concern that under the T.L.O. standard,
Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1177 (11th Cir. 2001) (Fourth Amendment violation of fifth-
grade students), and H.Y. ex rel K.Y. v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 2d
1174, 1187 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (Fourth Amendment violation of twelve and thirteen
year olds), and Watkins v. Millennium Sch., 290 F. Supp. 2d 890, 901 (S.D. Ohio
2003) (plaintiffs presented genuine issue of material fact suggesting a Fourth
Amendment violation of third graders), and Oliver v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206
(N.D. Ind. 1995) (defendant denied Summary Judgment on qualified immunity re-
garding Fourth Amendment violation of twelve and thirteen year olds), and Cales v.
Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 457 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (Fourth Amendment
violation of fifteen year old), with Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991
F.2d 1316, 1323 (7th Cir. 1993) (no Fourth Amendment violation of sixteen year old),
and Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 881-82 (6th Cir. 1991) (no Fourth Amend-
ment violation of high school student), and Singleton v. Bd. of Educ., 894 F. Supp.
386, 391 (D. Kan. 1995) (no Fourth Amendment violation of thirteen year old).
99. See, e.g., Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1323; Singleton, 894 F. Supp. at 391.
100. See cases cited supra note 99.
101. Singleton, 894 F. Supp. at 391.
102. Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1320.
103. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343-45 (1985). The Court noted that
possession of cigarettes was not a violation of school rules but that the possession of
the cigarettes was evidence that the student was violating the rule of not smoking.
See id.
104. See id. at 347.
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all school rules would be treated similarly regardless of the nature of the in-
fraction, resulting in searches of students "for curlers and sunglasses in order
to enforce the school dress code." 05 The majority opinion addressed Justice
Stevens' concern in a footnote by deferring to the judgment of school offi-
cials in adopting rules to protect order within the school system.' The Court
cautioned that judges should not evaluate or second-guess the relative impor-
tance of various school rules.107 Thus, the Court provided little guidance on
the nature of the infraction except to defer to the judgment of school officials
and to caution courts not to second-guess school policy. As a result, lower
courts received little guidance from TL.O. on how to distinguish one viola-
tion from another. In addition, some courts, despite the Supreme Court's
admonition, determined that certain school policies and violations did not
create an imminent harm to justify a strip search.'0o
The lower courts applying TL. 0. seemed to agree that a specific infrac-
tion must be suspected to justify strip searching a student, and that general
misbehavior is not enough. For example, in Cales v. Howell Public Schools,
a fifteen-year-old girl was caught in the school parking lot when she should
have been in class.109 When confronted, she tried to avoid detection and pro-
vided a false name.110 After school officials searched her purse, the student
was subjected to a strip search."' Although the principal suspected the stu-
dent might be involved in drug use, the court refused to "read T.L.O. so
broadly as to allow a school administrator the right to search a student be-
cause that student acts in such a way so as to create a reasonable suspicion
that the student has violated some rule or law.",l12 Instead, the court found
that a school official must demonstrate reasonable suspicion that the student
has violated a specific rule or law. 113
Most of the specific infractions of rules or laws can be categorized as ei-
ther drug possession violations or stolen money cases. While courts were
more likely to find a strip search permissible when drugs were involved than
when small amounts of money were missing, courts seemed to second-guess
school policies on imminent danger.
Judges tended to find the scope of strip searches permissible when drugs
were involved. For example, in Williams v. Ellington, the court found the
105. Id. at 377 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 342 n.9 ("We have 'repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with funda-
mental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools."')
(majority opinion).
107. Id.
108. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
109. 635 F. Supp. 454, 455 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
110. Id.
I 11. Id.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 75, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol75/iss4/2
STRIP SEARCHES OF STUDENTS
scope of the strip search was reasonable when officials were looking for a
white powdery substance.' 14 In Widener v. Frye, the court found the scope of
the search permissible in light of the nature of the infraction when school
officials were looking for marijuana."1 5  In Cornfield, the court found the
search of a student who was suspected of "crotching drugs" permissible be-
cause the strip search was the least intrusive way to confirm or deny their
* 116
suspicions.
On the other hand, judges were less comfortable permitting strip
searches to find stolen money. For example, the court in Oliver v. McClung
found the strip search of all the girls in a seventh rade gym class for a small
amount of missing money to be unreasonable. The court distinguished
Cornfield, Widener, and Williams, noting that they were all cases where there
was reasonable suspicion that the students had drugs, whereas the search in
this case was conducted "to recover the grand sum of four dollars and fifty
cents." Similarly, in Konop, a case involving the strip search of eighth-
grade girls in an attempt to find two hundred dollars missing from a gym
locker, the court found the search a violation, stating that the school officials
were not searching for weapons or drugs and that there was no imminent
harm. 119 In Thomas v. Clayton County Board of Education, a whole class of
fifth graders was strip searched for a missing twenty-six dollars.120 Both the
district court and the circuit court found that, although the teacher had reason
to believe the money was missing, she went beyond the permissible scope
because the students' privacy interests outweighed the school's interest in the
theft of twenty-six dollars. 12 Similarly, in Beard v. Whitmore Lake School
District, the search of high school students for missing prom money was not
permissible in scope because the students' privacy interests in their unclothed
bodies outweighed the school's interest in maintaining an atmosphere free of
theft.122
114. 936 F.2d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 1991).
115. 809 F. Supp. 35, 38 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
116. Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1323 (7th Cir.
1993). Contra Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 600 (2d Cir. 2006) (strip search of
girl suspected of possessing marijuana was Fourth Amendment violation because
there was not enough reasonable suspicion to justify search).
117. 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1218 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
118. Id. at 1217-18.
119. Konop v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1201-03, 1206 (D. S.D.
1998).
120. 94 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Ga. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Thomas ex rel. Thomas
v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated and remanded, 536 U.S. 953
(2002).
121. Id. at 1306; Roberts, 261 F.3d at 1169.
122. 402 F.3d 589, 605 (6th Cir. 2005). But see Singleton v. Bd. of Educ. USD
500, 894 F. Supp. 386, 391 (D. Kan. 1995) (search of thirteen-year-old male student
for one hundred and fifty dollars was reasonable in scope).
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In cases that did not fall neatly into the illegal drug or missing money
categories, courts struggled with schools' policies despite T.L.O.'s mandate to
defer to school policies. For instance, in Brannum v. Overton County School
Board, students were secretly videotaped while they undressed in locker
rooms.123 The court found that the school's policy of setting up the video
cameras to increase school security was "an appf0riate and common sense
purpose and not one subject to ... judicial veto. However, the court held
that setting up video cameras in the locker room was not justified when there
were no concerns about safety in the locker rooms.125 In addition, the court
admonished the school officials for failing to institute any policies designed
to protect the students' privacy, such as advising the students or their parents
that the students were being videotaped. 126
In Redding v. Safford Unified School District No. 1, the Ninth Circuit
held that school officials' conduct of strip searching a student for prescrip-
tion-strength ibuprofen violated the student's Fourth Amendment rights, in
direct conflict with the deference advocated by T.L.O.127 The court found
that, despite the school's concern with the sale of prescription medication,
possessing prescription-strength ibuprofen was "an infraction that poses an
imminent danger to no one." The court held the strip search for prescrip-
tion-strength ibuprofen was not reasonable in scope because the officials
could not justify the strip search of a thirteen-year-old for an infraction that
caused no imminent danger.129 "Nowhere does the T.L.O. Court tell us to
accord school officials' judgments unblinking deference. Nor does T.L.O.
provide blanket approval of strip searches of thirteen-year-olds remotely ru-
mored to have had Advil merely because of a generalized drug problem."l 30
3. The Location of the Search
Just as the T.L.O. Court was unclear about how courts should use "age
of the student" and "nature of the infraction," it did not specify whether rea-
sonable suspicion was necessary to search a specific location or whether it
was enough to justify a search anywhere on the student's person or posses-
sions. Even though T.L.O. only involved a search of a purse and not a strip
search, the Court implied that the location of the search was important, and
the court provided some clues as to what would be acceptable. First, the
Court discussed the fact that the vice principal could reasonably believe ciga-
123. 516 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 2008).
124. Id. at 496.
125. Id. at 499.
126. Id. at 497.
127. 531 F.3d 1071, 1085 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
128. Id.
129. Id at 1088.
130. Id. at 1080.
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rettes were hidden in a purse.131 Second, to justify the more intrusive search
deeper into the zipped portion of the purse, the T.L.O. opinion relied on the
fact that the vice principal found rolling papers in the initial search and there-
fore had reasonable suspicion that the purse might also contain other para-
phernalia or drugs.132 Thus, while the Court did not specifically address what
or where an official could search, it did seem to require some sort of suspi-
cion to search a particular location - not simply to search the student in gen-
eral.
However, most courts applying T.L.O. did not recognize the significance
of the location of the search in their analysis. As long as there was reasonable
suspicion that the suspect might possess money or drugs, most courts did not
address whether the money or drugs were more likely to be found inside the
students' clothes than in a locker, purse, or jacket pocket. In fact, many
searches simply escalated from purse or jacket to a strip search because noth-
ing was found during the less intrusive search,133 whereas in TL.O. the more
intrusive search was only lustified because of the evidence found during the
initial search of the purse.
Only two lower court cases either implicitly or explicitly addressed the
location of the search. First, in Cornfield, the Seventh Circuit found that the
strip search into a student's pants was justified because the school officials
had specific suspicion that the student was "crotching drugs."l 35 Second, in
Safford, the en bane Ninth Circuit decision specifically stated that the strip
search for prescription-strength ibuprofen was not reasonable in scope, in part
because the officials had no information that pills were hidden in the stu-
dent's undergarments.'36 Unlike the initial fruitful search of the purse in
TL.O., the search of the student's bag in Safford recovered no evidence to
131. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1985).
132. Id. at 347.
133. See, e.g., Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 883 (6th Cir. 1991) (search of
girls' lockers, purses, and books produced no drugs, so assistant principal forced one
of the girls to empty her pockets, remove her t-shirt, lower her jeans to her knees, and
remove her shoes and socks; the assistant principal then disputably pulled on the
elastic of the student's undergarments); Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454,
455 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (student was first asked to empty her purse and then asked to
remove her jeans and bend over for visual inspection of contents of her bra).
134. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347.
135. Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1323 (7th Cir.
1993).
136. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1085 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc), affd in part and rev'd in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). The court
dismissed the school's other justifications - allegations of alcohol consumption
months earlier, a tip that that Redding's friend had been distributing pills, hidden pills
in Redding's planner, and pills found on Redding's friend - as not related to a reason-
able belief that Redding was hiding pills on her person. Id. at 1083.
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provide any further suspicion that she might be concealing ibuprofen under-
neath her clothes.'37
Generally, lower courts have struggled to apply the second prong of the
T.L.O. test, which permits a search "when the measures adopted are reasona-
bly related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."'
Because the Court provided little guidance in the areas of the age and sex of
the child, the nature of the infraction, and the location of the search, lower
courts have applied these factors inconsistently.
C. Qualified Immunity
Because the T.L.O. Court found that the school official did not violate
the student's Fourth Amendment rights, it did not (nor did it need to) address
the issue of qualified immunity. When a plaintiff is able to prove a Fourth
Amendment violation, a government official will not be liable if he can prove
he is entitled to qualified immunity.139 The Supreme Court has held that
school officials have qualified, but not absolute, immunity, reasoning that
liability for every action would unfairly impose upon a school administrator
the burden of mistakes made in good faith.
Qualified immunity extends to individuals performing discretionary
functions, unless their actions violated "clearly established statutory or consti-
tutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."14 1 In order
for a plaintiff to overcome a defense of qualified immunity, he must show
both that the violated right was clearly established and that the right was
clearly established in the particular factual context in the case.142 A right is
clearly established if "a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right." 43 In 2002, in Hope v. Pelzer, Justice Stevens
wrote:
For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours
"must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would under-
stand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say
that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the
very action in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is
137. Id. at 1075.
138. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
139. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982).
140. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320-21 (1975).
141. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
142. Id. at 818-19.
143. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
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to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be
apparent."'4
For example, a student who sues a school official for an unreasonable
search and seizure must show not only that there was a Fourth Amendment
violation but also that the violation was "clearly established" at the time the
search occurred so as to defeat the defense of qualified immunity. Because
the T.L.O. test created many uncertainties in the law and the courts have been
inconsistent in their application of T.L.O. in strip search cases, the doctrine of
qualified immunity has been successfully employed in most cases over the
last twenty-five years as a shield to protect school officials from liability.
It would be more logical to expect that, as the law developed after the
T.L.O. decision, courts would begin to deny the defense of qualified immuni-
ty because school officials would have been put on notice by prior decisions.
However, no such pattern followed. In fact, earlier cases denied qualified
immunity, while later cases, confused by the varied case law, tended to grant
qualified immunity. For example, in the 1980 strip search case of Doe v.
Renfrow, the Seventh Circuit denied the defense of qualified immunity, stat-
ing, "It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude
search of a thirteen-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of
some magnitude. More than that: it is a violation of any known principle of
human decency."l 45 In 1985, the Eastern District of Michigan, in Cales v.
Howell Public Schools, was the first court to apply TL.O. to a strip search
case.146 Although the events of the case occurred before the Supreme Court's
ruling in TL.O., the district court held that the principal who ordered the
search was not protected by qualified immunity because the student had a
clearly established right to be free from unreasonable searches by school ad-
ministrators and that TL.O. had lowered the burden from probable cause to
reasonable suspicion - neither standard was met in this case.147
As the law on strip searches developed and more courts granted im-
munity to school officials, many lower courts complained about the vague
144. 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535
n.12 (1985); Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640) (internal citations omitted).
145. 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
146. 635 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
147. Id. at 458. Two other officials, the secretary and nurse, were granted quali-
fied immunity because they were simply following orders from the principal. Id. But
see Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 1991) (granting qualified im-
munity to defendants who had strip searched a high school student suspected of sell-
ing drugs, noting that Supreme Court and courts in the Sixth Circuit have been vir-
tually silent on Fourth Amendment rights of students despite fact that Cales was deci-
sion by a district court sitting in the Sixth Circuit). For a discussion of the ramifica-
tions of the Williams decision, see Jacqueline A. Stefkovich, Strip Searching After
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language of T.L.O. and the resulting doctrine of defacto absolute immunity.
In 1997, in Jenkins v. Talladega City Board of Education, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit granted qualified immunity to the school officials because "the law per-
taining to the application of the Fourth Amendment to the search of students
at school had not been developed in a concrete, factually similar context to
the extent that educators were on notice that their conduct was constitutional-
ly impermissible."l 48 In its reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit criticized both the
Supreme Court's vague language and the Court's application of the two-part
test in TL.O., stating:
Faced with a series of abstractions, on the one hand, and a declara-
tion of seeming deference to the judgments of school officials, on
the other, it is difficult to discern how TL.O. could be interpreted
to compel the conclusion that . . . all reasonable educators standing
in defendants' place - should have known that their conduct vi-
olated a clearly established constitutional right.149
The Eleventh Circuit seemed to conclude that no educator could be held
liable for any search because the law was not, and could not, be clarified, and
public officials should not be 'obligated to be creative or imaginative in
drawing analogies from previously decided cases."'i 50 In essence, the Jen-
kins court declared absolute immunity for strip searches in schools because
T.L.O. was too general to serve as a useful guide.
Similarly, in Thomas v. Clayton County Board of Education, both the
district court and the Eleventh Circuit found that the defendants were entitled
to qualified immunity because the law "was not so developed in this circuit as
to unequivocally tripger an awareness in defendants that they were clearly
violating the law."' ' To justify its holding, the district court agreed with
Jenkins that T.L.O. was very general and did not provide any guidance but
then asserted that Jenkins itself did not provide any further clarification as it
did not rule on whether the teachers' actions violated the Fourth Amend-
148. 115 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 1997). Despite granting qualified immunity,
the Eleventh Circuit conceded "that the defendants likely exercised questionable
judgment," but the court refused to "engage in polemics regarding the wisdom of the
defendants' conduct." Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 827 (quoting Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriffs Dept., 962 F.2d
1563, 1575 (11th Cir. 1992) (Edmonson, J., dissenting)). But see Konop v. Nw. Sch.
Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. S.D. 1998) (disagreeing with Jenkins, stating that
T.L.O. is neither unclear nor confusing and complaining that Jenkins' interpretation
would lead to absolute immunity).
151. 94 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1309 (N.D. Ga. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Thomas ex rel
Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160 (1 th Cir. 2001), vacated and remanded, 536 U.S.
953 (2002); see also Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160.
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ment.152 Asserting that the doctrine of qualified immunity sets "high hur-
dles," the court essentially affirmed Jenkins' doctrine of absolute immunity,
stating that teachers who make mistakes in judgment are protected "even
when a federal court determines that, in hindsight, the teacher's acts exceeded
a judicially set standard."' 53 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
opinion in Thomas, agreeing that T.L.O. did not attempt to establish the con-
tours of the Fourth Amendment within various school situations.' 54
In addition to the vague language in TL.O., the inconsistent rulings
from lower courts struggling to interpret TL.O. have provided more ammuni-
tion for school officials to claim the law is unclear so that qualified immunity
must apply. As a result, in very similar circumstances, some courts have
granted qualified immunity, while others have denied it. For example, where
strip searches were conducted because drugs were suspected, some courts
granted qualified immunity, whereas others did not.'"' Similarly, inconsistent
results occurred with cases involving strip searches for missing amounts of
money. 1 In fact, no pattern even exists within each circuit. The Sixth Cir-
cuit granted qualified immunity in two strip search cases but denied it in three
others.'5 7 Courts in the Seventh Circuit have granted qualified immunity in
one strip search case and denied it in another, and courts in the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits are similarly inconsistent."'
152. Clayton County, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1310.
153. Id. at 1311-12.
154. Roberts, 261 F.3d at 1170-71.
155. Compare Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1085
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff'd in party and rev'd in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009)
(qualified immunity denied where prescription-strength ibuprofen suspected), and
Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 455 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (qualified im-
munity denied for assistant principal where drugs suspected), with Cornfield v. Con-
sol. High Sch. Dist., 991 F.2d 1316, 1324 (7th Cir. 1993) (qualified immunity granted
where student suspected of "'crotching' drugs").
156. Compare Watkins v. Millennium Sch., 290 F. Supp. 2d 890, 903 (S.D. Ohio
2003) (qualified immunity denied where students strip searched for $10), and Konop
v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1208 (D. S.D. 1998) (qualified immunity
denied where students strip searched for $200), and Oliver v. McClung, 919 F. Supp.
1206, 1219 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (qualified immunity denied where students strip
searched for $4.50), with Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 589, 601 (6th
Cir. 2005) (qualified immunity granted where students strip searched for prom mon-
ey), and Clayton County, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1312 (qualified immunity granted where
students strip searched for $12).
157. Compare Beard, 401 F.3d at 606 (qualified immunity granted), and Williams
v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991) (qualified immunity granted), with Bran-
num v. Overton County Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 500 (6th Cir. 2008) (qualified im-
munity denied), and Watkins, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 903 (qualified immunity denied),
and Cales, 635 F. Supp. at 458 (qualified immunity denied).
158. Compare Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1324 (qualified immunity granted), with
Oliver, 919 F. Supp. at 1219 (qualified immunity denied). Compare Jenkins v. Talla-
11452010]
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These cases presented confusing and conflicting precedent for school of-
ficials and courts trying to apply the T.L.O. test in a variety of school settings.
As a result, qualified immunity was used as a shield for school officials who
had violated students' Fourth Amendment rights because the officials were
able to claim that the law on strip searching in schools remained unclear. It
was against this inconsistent and confusing backdrop that the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding.159
Many scholars and pundits assumed that the Supreme Court had granted cer-
tiorari in the case to finally clarify the T.L.O. standard in the strip search con-
text; however, the Court missed this critical opportunity.'so
III. A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO RECTIFY THE STRIP SEARCH CRISIS:
SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIsTRICT No. 1 v. REDDING
In Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, thirteen-year-old
Savana Redding was strip searched in school in an attempt to find prescrip-
tion-strength ibuprofen in her undergarments.161 She was implicated by a
friend who had been caught with prescription-strength ibuprofen and other
contraband in a day planner that belonged to Redding.162 Redding had loaned
the planner to the friend days earlier. 163 After questioning the friend, the
principal interrogated Redding.16 When Redding denied knowledge of the
pills, the principal searched her backpack. 16 Although this search revealed
nothing, the principal ordered the nurse to strip search Redding.' By the
end of the search, Redding was wearing nothing but her bra and underwear
and was forced to pull them away from her body and shake them, revealing
both her breasts and pelvic area.16 No ibuprofen was found. 68
dega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 1997) (qualified immunity
granted), with Konop, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1208 (qualified immunity denied).
159. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008)
(en banc), rev'd 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), affid in part and rev'd in
part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
160. See, e.g., Suedekum, supra note 15 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's en banc
decision and predicting possible outcomes of the Supreme Court decision, then pend-
ing).
161. 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2637 (2009).
162. Id. at 2640-41.
163. Id. at 2638.
164. Id. at 2640-41.
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Savana Redding and her mother sued the school district, alleging that
the school district violated Savana's Fourth Amendment rights.1 69 The dis-
trict court found no Fourth Amendment violation, 170 and a divided Ninth Cir-
cuit Court panel affirmed. 171 The Ninth Circuit granted an en banc hearing
and reversed.172 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, 73 and the
parties and a number of amici filed briefs.174
All the briefs called for clarity in the law, with the Respondent school
district arguing for clear language that strip searches should be held to a high-
er level of scrutiny and Petitioner Redding seeking more clarity in qualified
immunity standards.175 Most of the briefs implored the Court to clarify the
T.L.O. test and its application so that school officials and courts could have
adequate guidance and fair notice of their responsibilities to protect students'
169. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 504 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir.
2007), rev'd, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), affdin part and rev'd in part,
129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 836.
172. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008)
(en banc), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). Referencing T.L.O.,
Cornfield, and Phaneuf the Ninth Circuit applied a sliding scale test and held that the
search was not justified at its inception because, while reasonable suspicion may have
justified the initial search of the backpack and pockets, it was unreasonable to proceed
to a strip search. Id. at 1081. Applying the specific facts, the court found the search
was not justified at its inception because it was based primarily on an unsubstantiated
tip from an accused student seeking to shift blame from herself to Redding. Id at
1085. In addition, the court found the search was not reasonable in scope because the
officials had no information that the pills were hidden in her undergarments, and the
officials could not justify the strip search of a thirteen-year-old for an infraction that
caused no imminent danger. Id. Balancing the trauma intrinsic to a strip search of a
child with the school's interest in curbing prescription drug use, the court found that
possessing ibuprofen, "an infraction that poses an imminent danger to no one," was
excessively intrusive. Id. The court held that Redding's rights were clearly estab-
lished at the time she was strip searched and denied the school's assistant principal
the defense of qualified immunity. Id. at 1089, 1074.
173. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 987 (2009).
174. In addition to the briefs filed by the parties, the following amicus briefs were
filed: Brief of Amici Curiae The Rutherford Institute et al. in Support of Respondent,
supra note 15; Brief of Amici Curiae the National School Boards Ass'n and American
Ass'n of School Administrators in Support of Petitioners, supra note 15; Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, supra note 15; Brief of Amici
Curiae the National Ass'n of Social Workers and its Arizona Chapter et al. in Support
of Respondent April Redding, supra note 15.
175. See sources cited supra note 174; see also Brief for Respondent at *22, Saf-
ford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479), 2009
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constitutional rights.'76 The government's amicus brief specifically stated,
"TL.O. cannot plausibly be read to establish the law applicable to such a
highly particularized set of facts with the clarity necessary to defeat qualified
immunity," 77 implying that absolute immunity resulted from the ambiguous
law created by T.L.O. and its precedents. The amicus for the school officials
was most compelling in its plea to the Court to clarify T.L.O. and "render a
decision that gives direction to educators on how properly to apply the justi-
fied-at-inception and the reasonable-in-scope prongs established in that
case."178
A. The Supreme Court's Decision
The majority opinion, written by Justice Souter, reads more like a trial
court opinion simply following established precedent than a Supreme Court
decision resolving conflicting circuit court law or clarifying muddled juri-
sprudence. In applying the T.L.O. two-prong test, the Court held that the strip
search of Redding violated her Fourth Amendment rights but that the princip-
al was entitled to qualified immunity because the law on the issue was un-
clear. 79
The opinion first addressed the "justified at its inception" prong and
found that the school official had enough suspicion to justify a general search
of Redding's backpack and outer clothing and that the search of her bag was
not excessively intrusive.iso In addressing the more intrusive search into
Redding's clothing, the Court refused to specifically label or define "strip
176. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae the National School Boards Ass'n and Amer-
ican Ass'n of School Administrators in Support of Petitioners, supra note 15, at *17
(stating it would be reasonable for the Court to require a less intrusive search before a
strip search, explain the age and gender factor, and give more deference to school
officials when there is higher possibility of danger); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, supra note 15, at *17.
177. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, supra
note 15, at *9.
178. Brief of Amici Curiae the National School Boards Ass'n and American
Ass'n of School Administrators in Support of Petitioners, supra note 15, at *3.
179. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2644. Redding and children's rights advocates seemed
ready to claim victory. In a Washington Post article after the decision, Redding was
quoted as saying that she felt "'fantastic"' because the 'legal battle was to make sure
it didn't happen to anyone else."' Robert Barnes, Student Strip Search Illegal: School
Violated Teen Girl's Rights, Supreme Court Rules, WASH. POST, June 26, 2009,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/06/25/
AR2009062501690.html. However, because of the Court's failures to clarify the law,
strip searches can continue to happen to other students like Savana Redding.
180. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2641. This reasoning was similar to the reasoning in
T.L.O., where the court explained that the principal had reasonable suspicion to search
the student's purse for cigarettes because a teacher had accused her of smoking in the
bathroom. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1985).
[Vol. 751148
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search," but it conceded that the search of Redding could be called a strip
search and then admitted that these types of searches are so degrading that
some communities have forbidden them. 1 However, the Court failed to
outlaw school strip searches altogether or require a higher level of suspicion
to justify them. Instead, it adopted the sliding scale test applied in the Ninth
Circuit en banc decision as well as in the Seventh and Second Circuits. Al-
though the Court did not explicitly state that it was adopting the sliding scale
test, the Court applied such a test, holding that the "content of the suspicion
failed to match the degree of intrusion." 2 The Supreme Court in Safford
found that the official had reasonable suspicion to search Redding's backpack
and outer clothing but not enough suspicion to strip search her.183
Next, the Court analyzed the scope prong of the TL.O. test, relying on
the standard set out in TL.O. that a search "will be permissible in its scope
when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the
search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student
and the nature of the infraction."l84 Similar to TL.O.'s application of the
facts, the Safford Court simply mentioned that the student was a thirteen-
year-old girl but did not explain how her age or gender factored into the anal-
ysis. Instead, the Court focused on the "nature of the infraction" language
from the TL.O. opinion. Reasoning that the suspected contraband needed
to pose an immediate threat of danger to the students to justify a strip search,
the Court held that the prescription pills did not threaten to cause imminent
danger to the students. The Court also discussed the location of the search,
specifically finding that the school official could not have suspected that
Redding was concealing the contraband in her clothes.' 87 In its holding, the
Court found that the combination of the location of the search and the lack of
danger to the other students was "fatal to finding the search reasonable."' 88
Despite the Fourth Amendment violation, the Court found that the school
officials were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity because the law
on the issue of strip searches was unclear.
181. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2641-42 (citing New York City Dept. of Educ., Reg.
No. A-432, p.2 (2005), available at http://docs.nycenet.edu/docushare/dsweb/Get/
Document-2 1 A-432.pdf ("Under no circumstances shall a strip-search of a student be
conducted.")).
182. Id. at 2642 ("But when the categorically extreme intrusiveness of a search
down to the body of an adolescent requires some justification in suspected facts, gen-
eral background possibilities fall short; a reasonable search that extensive calls for
suspicion that it will pay off.").
183. Id. at 2643.
184. Id at 2639 (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342).
185. Id. at 2642.
186. Id. at 2636.
187. Id. at 2642.
188. Id. at 2643.
189. Id. at 2644.
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B. The Supreme Court's Shortcomings
In failing to require probable cause in all strip searches of students, the
Supreme Court in Safford missed a critical opportunity to redress Fourth
Amendment violations occurring across the country. First, the Safford opi-
nion should have distinguished strip searches as far too intrusive for a vague
reasonableness test and required probable cause for all strip searches in
schools. Instead, it simply followed the two-prong test set out in T.L.O. for
the search of a purse and applied it to strip searches. Second, while the Saf-
ford opinion clarified some of the ambiguities resulting from T.L.O. and its
progeny by requiring imminent danger to students and reasonable suspicion
to search a specific location, the Court did not go far enough to protect stu-
dents' rights. As a result, the opinion actually creates more confusion than
clarity. Third, the Court incorrectly shielded school officials from liability
under the doctrine of qualified immunity. As a result, students will continue
to be unprotected from unreasonable strip searches because the law on strip
searches remains murky, allowing school officials to escape liability through
qualified immunity.
1. The TL. 0. Policy Does Not Translate to Strip Searches
The Safford Court failed to require probable cause in all strip search
cases and was obviously uncomfortable with applying the lower reasonable-
ness standard enunciated in T.L.O. to strip search cases. The Court stated,
The very fact of Savana's pulling her underwear away from her
body in the presence of the two officials who were able to see her
necessarily exposed her breasts and pelvic area to some degree,
and both subjective and reasonable societal expectations of person-
al privacy support the treatment of such a search as categorically
distinct, requiring distinct elements of justification on the part of
school authorities for going beyond a search of outer clothing and
belongings.190
Thus, while the Court conceded that a strip search was "categorically
distinct," it failed to adopt a bright-line test for this specific category of
searches.191 As a result, Safford condoned the application of the T.L.O. rea-
sonableness test - a test used to justify searches of purses - in strip search
incidents, simply because the strip search also occurred in the school envi-
ronment.
However, the reasonableness standard is inappropriate for a number of
reasons. The T.L.O. Court justified a lower standard by relying on policy
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from Terry stop and frisk law, but the policy behind an on-the-street pat-
down search does not translate to a strip search within the confines of school
walls.' 92 Had the Safford Court applied the balancing test relied upon in
T.L.O. to strip search cases, it would have found that the trauma to students
from strip searches outweighs a school's interests in preserving order.
The T.L.O. decision recognized that students have a legitimate, albeit
lower, expectation of privacy at school in their personal belongings such as
keys, money, and necessities for personal hygiene.'93 They may keep these
items in their purses or pockets as they move from classroom to classroom.
Many students in lower grades simply hang their backpacks on communal
hooks or cubbies within the classroom. However, it does not follow that stu-
dents have a lower expectation of privacy in their bodies simply by walking
onto school grounds. In fact, in 1969, the Supreme Court held that school
children do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse
gate."' 94
In order to justify the lower standard of scrutiny, the TL. 0. Court relied
on the language and reasoning of Terry v. Ohio.'95 Just as Terry found that
the government has an interest in protecting police officers on the street and
in preventing crime,196 T.L.O. reasoned that school officials have an interest
in maintaining order in their schools.197 Just as Terry reasoned that a limited
pat-down search of citizens on the street is justified on less than probable
cause, the T.L.O. Court applied the same two-part testl98 and reasoned that a
search of a student by a school official can be justified on less than probable
cause when it is justified at its inception and permissible in scope.' 9 While
this reasoning for a pat-down search on the street may have transferred to a
pat-down of outer clothing or a bag in a school, it is nonsensical to extend
that reasoning to justify a strip search where genitals are exposed. Moreover,
people who are frisked on the street are presumably less likely to be victims
of police abuse of discretion because they are exposed to other citizens and
protected by that exposure. Students who are forced to remove their clothing
192. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
193. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338-39 (1985).
194. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
195. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
196. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
197. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
198. Compare id. at 341 ("Determining the reasonableness of any search involves
a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider 'whether the . .. action was justified at its
inception;' second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted 'was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place."') (citations omitted), with Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 ("[I]n determining
whether the seizure and search were 'unreasonable' our inquiry is a dual one-whether
the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably re-
lated in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.").
199. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 326.
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alone within the confines of a closed principal or nurse's office are not simi-
larly protected by other watchful citizens or students. The Safford Court
should have recognized that while the Terry reasoning might apply to
searches of purses and lockers in schools, it should not extend to strip
searches of students simply because those searches also occur in school.
In justifying the lower standard, the T.L.O. Court balanced schools' in-
terests in protecting order with students' privacy interests.200 Although the
Safford Court admitted that strip searches are humiliating to students,201 it
failed to apply the same balancing test. Other courts have long recognized
the traumatic nature of strip searches, describing them as humiliating, de-
meaning, degrading, and traumatic.202 Studies have found children who have
been subject to a strip search can be greatly traumatized by the experience.203
Students who have been strip searched have been found to do worse in
school, and often transfer, as Savana Redding did in Safford,204 or drop out.205
In addition, they often suffer from sleep disturbance, recurrent recollection of
the event, anxiety, inability to concentrate, depression, and phobias.206 Be-
cause adolescents are self-conscious about their bodies and relate their bodies
to their self-esteem, strip searches can have the same traumatic results as sex-
ual abuse or rape.207 The fact that the school official is substantially older
than the student and is in a position of authority can worsen the traumatic
effect.208 To make matters worse, other students hear about the strip searches
and the whole student body no longer trusts the school administration, creat-
ing a dysfunctional community. When weighing the likely traumatic harm to
the student against the governmental interest in possibly discovering evidence
or preventing a possible harm to the school community, the balancing clearly
weighs in favor of a heightened level of suspicion, such as probable cause, to
200. Id. at 337.
201. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009).
202. See, e.g., Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 395-96 (10th Cir. 1993); Jus-
tice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 192-93 (11th Cir. 1992); Doe v. Ren-
frow, 631 F.2d 91, 93-94 (7th Cir. 1980).
203. See Laura L. Finley, Examining School Searches as Systemic Violence, 14
CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 117, 126 (2006).
204. Adam Liptak, Strip-Search of Girl Tests Limit of School Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/us/
24savana.html?pagewanted=& r-3.
205. Finley, supra note 203, at 126.
206. Brief of Amici Curiae the National Ass'n of Social Workers and its Arizona
Chapter et al. in Support of Respondent April Redding, supra note 15, at *7-8 (citing
Shatz et al., supra note 88).
207. See David C. Blickenstaff, Strip Searches of Public School Students: Can
New Jersey v. T.L.O. Solve the Problem?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 1, 45 (1994); Shatz et al.,
supra note 88, at 11. Strip searches have also been defined as "visual rape." See Paul
R. Shuldiner, Visual Rape: A Look at the Dubious Legality of Strip Searches, 13 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 273 (1980).
208. See Blickenstaff, supra note 207, at 45.
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protect the student. The Safford opinion failed to balance these interests,
relying instead on the T.L.O. opinion's analysis that the balance weigs in
favor of school officials when they search for drugs in a student's purse.
Thus, the Court applied flawed reasoning to justify strip searches in
schools and failed to adequately balance students' interests in remaining free
from unreasonable and traumatic searches against schools' interests in main-
taining order. Instead, Safford should have distinguished strip searches from
general searches of students and required school officials to have probable
cause to justify strip searching their students.
2. The Court Created More Ambiguity than Lucidity in its Application
of the T.L.O. Test
Instead of requiring probable cause in all strip search cases, the Safford
opinion simply applied the TL. 0. two-prong test to the facts of the case. The
Court failed to define the term "strip search" and instead applied a sliding
scale test. In addition, while making some headway into protecting students
under the second prong of the T.L.O. test, the Court created further ambiguity
in a number of other areas. The Court also incorrectly shielded the school
officials from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Because the
law remains unclear, the doctrine of qualified immunity will continue to ef-
fectively act as absolute immunity to protect the unbridled discretion of
school officials, and students' Fourth Amendment rights will continue to be
violated in the future.
a. The Sliding Scale Test and the Failure to Define "Strip Search"
The Safford Court should not have applied a sliding scale test to strip
searches. A sliding scale test in this situation is unworkable for a number of
reasons. A sliding scale test creates more uncertainty for school officials and
courts because there are so many variations along the parameters of general
searches in schools. Such a mercurial test leaves officials wondering if a
search of a purse is more intrusive than the search of a locker or whether a
search of a pocket is more intrusive than the search of a purse. In addition, it
will be difficult for school officials and courts to determine whether a strip
search has actually occurred using a sliding scale test because the Court re-
fused to label or define the term "strip search."210
Even if the Supreme Court had defined "strip search," each subsequent
court would be forced to decide the degree of intrusiveness of each strip
search under a sliding scale test. Does pulling down pants to the knees re-
quire less suspicion than pulling down pants to the ankles? Is lifting a dress
209. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643-44
(2009).
210. Id. at 2641 (stating that exact label is not important).
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more intrusive than lowering pants? Is searching underwear more or less
intrusive than searching a bra? As petitioners and some amici argued in their
briefs, a sliding scale test would require school officials to decide which
searches were minimally intrusive, requiring only reasonable suspicion, and
which were more intrusive searches, requiring something more than reasona-
ble suspicion. The sliding scale approach could "end in hopeless confusion
for the school officials who are left with the daunting task of trying to apply
it.,,211
Instead of applying a sliding scale test, the Supreme Court should have
defined a strip search and required probable cause for all searches meeting
that definition. While the Court stated that the exact label for the search in
this case was "not important," it conceded that "strip search" was a "fair way
to speak of it." 212 This "I know it when I see it" approach213 provides no
guidance to school officials or lower courts when trying to decide where a
search falls on the sliding scale. In fact, the definition of strip search is ex-
tremely important: if the Supreme Court had provided a definition and re-
quired probable cause whenever a school official decided to conduct a search
that fell within that definition, school officials and lower courts would have
some guidelines to follow so that students would be protected from the un-
bridled discretion now afforded to school officials.
The Supreme Court's findings on the second, "scope" prong of T.L.O.,
albeit a bit more helpful than the first, "justification" prong, also fall short in
terms of providing enough clarity and precision to overcome a defense of
qualified immunity. The Court failed to discuss the relevance of the age and
gender of the student. Also, although the Court required imminent danger to
students to justify a strip search, it left open the question as to who should
decide whether there is a threat of imminent danger - the schools or the
courts. Finally, while the Court required school officials to have some suspi-
cion that contraband is located within a student's clothing before performing
a strip search, the Court should have required a heightened level of scrutiny -
that of probable cause that a student is hiding something in his clothing - to
justify an intrusive strip search.
b. The Age and Sex of the Student
While the Safford Court mentioned the importance of "age and sex" in
its application of the scope of the intrusion prong of T.L.O., it did not distin-
guish which age or what sex was more at risk for trauma from a strip search,
nor did it provide guidance on how to apply these factors in the future. Nei-
211. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 175, at *33.
212. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2641.
213. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (Stewart, J., concurring) (describ-
ing case-by-case approach to determine whether pornographic film is obscene).
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ther had T.L.O. 214 In fact, many of the circuit courts were confused with how
to apply these factors and needed guidance; most of the circuit court opinions
simply stated the age and sex of the students but did nothing with this infor-
215
mation. Rather than discussing the sex of the student searched, some
courts considered the sex of the school official performing the actual strip
search to uphold the reasonableness of the search, in part because an official
of the same sex performed the search.2 16 While this consideration might be
relevant for defending claims of sexual assault against school officials, it does
not help decide whether the search itself was reasonable in scope. Instead,
the relevant question is whether a child is of the age that she will feel embar-
rassed and degraded from a strip search.
The Court may have been avoiding the true fact: age and sex are not
significant factors, and, in fact, would be difficult for any school administra-
tor to consider. While historical studies have shown that children who reach
the age of adolescence are more inclined to be self-conscious of their bodies
than younger children, there are no bright line rules to differentiate when a
child becomes an adolescent or when an adolescent becomes an adult.217
Therefore, any attempt to establish a bright line rule would be unfair and
counterproductive. Would it be worse to search a physically advanced
fourth-grade student or an immature eighth-grade student? Should girls have
more of a right to privacy than boys? It makes little sense to ask school offi-
cials and courts to treat one class of students (whether based on age or sex)
differently from another. Therefore, the Safford Court should have expressly
mandated that age and sex were not significant factors instead of simply ig-
noring them.
c. The Danger to Students
In its discussion of the "nature of the infraction" language from T.L.O.,
the Safford Court clarified one aspect of the law by specifically requiring
school officials to reasonably believe students are in danger before resorting
218to a strip search. The TL.O. Court cautioned courts to avoid second-
guessing school policies and demanded that courts give school officials broad
discretion in crafting rules regarding dangerous situations.219 However, the
Safford Court ignored the mandates of T.L.O. and substituted its own judg-
ment for that of the school official, finding that the possession of prescription
214. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
215. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 87-97 and
accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
217. See Shatz et al., supra note 88, at 15 (noting that ages 7, 14, and 21 appear
over and over again in Western societies as important transition points in children's
development).
218. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643 (2009).
219. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
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pills did not indicate danger to the students and stating that the ibuprofen
caused "imminent danger to no one" 220 and that "nondangerous school con-
traband does not raise the specter of stashes in intimate places."221 Thus,
while the Court required imminent danger to students in order to justify a
strip search, it trivialized the school officials' policy against possession of
nonprescription pills, leavin open the question of whether courts can veto
school policies in the future.
d. The Location of the Search
In its discussion of scope, the Safford opinion also clarified the law re-
garding the location of a strip search. The Court found that an official must
have reasonable suspicion that a student is hiding contraband as well as rea-
sonable suspicion that she is concealing it within her clothes - not just that it
223
would be possible to conceal it within her clothes. While some courts had
224
alluded to such a location requirement, especially in cases where there was
no individualized suspicion, most courts permitted searches in clothing simp-
ly because the item could have been hidden there. 225
The location requirement from Safford was consistent with the applica-
tion of the facts in T.L.O. In T.L.O., the Court found the principal had rea-
sonable suspicion that the student was hiding cigarettes in her purse because a
teacher had found her smoking in the bathroom. 26 Initially, a school official
found only rolling papers, which provided suspicion for the second, deeper
search of the purse for drug paraphernalia.227 But in Safford, no one had ac-
cused Redding of stashing the prescription-strength ibuprofen in her under-
220. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1085 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
221. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2642-43. The United States, in its amicus brief, com-
plained that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly substituted its own judgment for that of the
school officials when it found that the ibuprofen caused "'imminent danger to no
one,"' relying on T.L.O.'s admonition that courts should not reevaluate the school's
judgment in reliance on their own views of whether the rule is necessary or worthy of
enforcement by intrusive search. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Reversal, supra note 15, at *19-20, *25.
222. This criticism is also endorsed by Justice Thomas. See Safford, 129 S. Ct. at
2651-52 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Such a test is unworkable and unsound. School
officials cannot be expected to halt searches based on the possibility that a court
might later find that the particular infraction at issue is not severe enough to warrant
an intrusive investigation.").
223. Id. at 2642-43 (majority opinion).
224. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 133. T.L.O. only discussed the search of a student's purse
and did not provide further insight into location as a factor. See supra notes 131-34
and accompanying text.
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wear. 228 While T.L.O. was not explicit in its location requirement, Safford
clarified the need for the suspicion to relate to the location searched. 229 How-
ever, the Safford opinion could have gone further. Instead of requiring mere
reasonable suspicion that the item may be concealed within underclothing,
the Court should have required probable cause to believe the item is hidden
under clothes to justify a search as intrusive as a strip search. Such a re-
quirement is well grounded in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as the Su-
preme Court has found in other cases that "the scope of a lawful search is
'defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable
cause to believe that it may be found."'
230
As an unintended consequence, the Safford Court's requirement that a
school official have reasonable suspicion that an item is hidden in a specific
location should help cure situations where strip searches occur in schools
231
without individualized suspicion. School officials have attempted to justify
these searches based on the "special needs" exception of Skinner and Verno-
nia,232 reasoning that because schools present a "special need," no individua-
233lized suspicion is necessary. However, strip searches are so invasive they
should not be used even if a school possesses a "special need." Now, based
on Safford's reasoning, an official can no longer simply strip search all stu-
dents of a fifth-grade class for missing contraband unless he can show a rea-
sonable suspicion that it was hidden under one of the students' clothing.
Thus, the Safford opinion could be read to prohibit officials from searching a
group of students without individualized suspicion.
Therefore, while the Safford Court specified that the scope of the search
must be justified by imminent danger to students, it failed to clarify who de-
cides the issue of danger within each school system. In addition, while the
228. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2642.
229. Id. at 2643.
230. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (quoting United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982)) (emphasis added).
231. See, e.g., Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 606 (6th Cir.
2005) (qualified immunity granted despite Fourth Amendment violation when no
individualized suspicion was present); Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d
950, 951, 956 (11th Cir. 2003) (qualified immunity granted despite Fourth Amend-
ment violation when official had no individualized suspicion). But see Brannum v.
Overton County Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 500 (6th Cir. 2008) (qualified immunity
denied when no individualized suspicion); H.Y. ex rel. K.Y. v. Russell County Bd. of
Educ., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1190 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (qualified immunity denied with
no individualized suspicion); Watkins v. Millennium Sch., 290 F. Supp. 2d 890, 901,
903 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (qualified immunity denied when no individualized suspicion);
Konop v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1208 (D. S.D. 1998) (qualified im-
munity denied with no individualized suspicion).
232. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Watkins, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 900; Thomas v. Clayton County Bd. of
Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Thomas ex rel.
Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated, 536 U.S. 953 (2002).
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Court clarified that an official needs suspicion that the contraband is con-
cealed in the location searched and may have inadvertently prohibited strip
searches in group situations where there is no individualized suspicion, the
Court should have required probable cause that the contraband is concealed
within a student's clothing to justify a strip search.
3. The Court Incorrectly Shielded the Official with
Qualified Immunity
Although the Court correctly held that Redding's Fourth Amendment
rights had been violated, it incorrectly found that qualified immunity pro-
tected the school official from liability.234 Referring to a few circuit cases
where strip searches were upheld because of qualified immunity, the Court
held that the differences of opinion of other judges were enough to require
immunity for the school officials in this case.235 The Court seemed to deny
that its holding effectively awarded the school officials absolute immunity,
stating:
We would not suggest that entitlement to qualified immunity is the
guaranteed product of disuniform views of the law in the other fed-
eral, or state, courts, and the fact that a single judge, or even a
group of judges, disagrees about the contours of a right does not
236
automatically render the law unclear if we have been clear.
However, the Court's finding on qualified immunity relied on the wrong
standard and was unclear. Instead of relying on the differences of opinions of
other judges, the Court should have applied the qualified immunity standard it
clearly enunciated in 2002 in Hope v. Pelzer:
For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours
"must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would under-
stand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say
that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the
very action in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is
to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be
apparent." 237
If the Safford Court had applied this qualified immunity standard, it
would have found that it was sufficiently clear to the school official that strip
234. See Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2644.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (citation omitted).
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searching a thirteen-year-old was a Fourth Amendment violation based on a
single case. In 1980, the Seventh Circuit clearly stated in Doe v. Renfrow that
"It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of
a thirteen-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magni-
tude."238 In Renfrow, an objective actor, a drug-sniffing dog, singled out the
student.239  In Safford, a student who had been caught with pills accused
another student of providing them to her.240 There was no accusation that
Redding currently possessed any pills, nor was it suggested that she was con-
cealing them in her clothes.241 Renfrow called the strip search a "violation of
any known principle of human decency" and denied school officials the qual-
ified immunity defense.242 Unknown to most followers of the Safford case,
the school official had in fact strip searched three students (Redding, her
friend, and another student who had provided some information about drug
trafficking at the school).243 In addition, the principal forced Redding to wait
244
alone for over two hours outside his office after she was strip searched.
Such an abuse of discretion by a school principal can hardly be deemed rea-
sonable under any standard.
In addition to citing Renfrow, the Court could have focused on a pletho-
ra of circuit cases that provided notification to the officials that their conduct
violated the Fourth Amendment. Interestingly, in its discussion of qualified
immunity, the Court chose to mention only three of those prior federal court
strip search cases - Williams, Jenkins, and Thomas - despite the variety of
cases from which to choose.245 All three cases protected the school officials
with qualified immunity. In Williams, one of the first cases to apply the
T.L.O. test, the Sixth Circuit found that the courts had been virtually silent on
the Fourth Amendment rights of students and therefore concluded that the
school officials had no notice of the application of the new law.246 But in
Safford, the Supreme Court could make no such claim in light of the plethora
of federal strip search cases since 1985. Ironically, both the Jenkins and
Thomas opinions specifically criticized the T.L.O. standard, claiming it was
unworkable because it was too general to serve as a working guide and infer-
238. 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir. 1980).
239. Id. at 91-92.
240. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2640.
241. Id. at 2642.
242. Renfrow, 631 F.2d at 92-93.
243. Liptak, supra note 204.
244. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
245. See Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1171-72 (11th Cir.
2001), vacated and remanded, 536 U.S. 953 (2002); Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of
Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 1997); Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 889
(6th Cir. 1991).
246. See Williams, 936 F.2d at 884-85.
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ring that school officials were protected by defacto absolute immunity. In
both cases, the courts found that the school officials violated the Fourth
Amendment by going beyond the permissible scope in their strip searches but
granted qualified immunity.248
Instead of focusing on the immunity discussion in these cases, the Court
should have determined that the Fourth Amendment violations found in those
cases provided notice to the officials that their actions - while perhaps not
clear violations at the time - were now clear violations as established by
those courts. By avoiding discussion of the actual violations found in those
cases and selectively ignoring many other strip search cases where violations
249
were found but qualified immunity was denied, the Court incorrectly
granted the defense of qualified immunity to protect the school officials.250
Thus, while the Safford Court did find a Fourth Amendment violation
and made some important clarifications in the law, it incorrectly relied on the
inappropriate lower reasonableness standard from T.L.O., failed to clarify
some of the ambiguities in the first and second prongs of the TL.O. test, and
incorrectly shielded the school officials with qualified immunity. As a result,
lower courts and school officials can simply distinguish their strip searches
by differentiating the facts or hiding behind defacto absolute immunity when
strip searching students. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, in their separate
opinions, attacked the majority for failing to explicitly modify or clarify the
application of the T.L.O. test as well as for finding qualified immunity. Jus-
tice Stevens specifically complained about the failure to clarify the law and
further admonished the Court for finding qualified immunity based on see-
mingly divergent views about TL.O.'s application by circuit courts.251 JUS-
tice Ginsburg sharply rebuked the school official for abusing his authority
when he ordered the strip search and then required Redding to wait two hours
252
outside his office with no attempt to call her parents. Even Justice Tho-
247. See Jenkins, 115 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 1997); Thomas v. Clayton County
Bd. of Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1312 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (teachers who make mis-
takes in judgment are protected "even when a federal court determines that, in hind-
sight, the teacher's acts exceeded a judicially set standard"), aff'd sub nom. Thomas
ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated and remanded,
536 U.S. 953 (2002).
248. See Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 828; Clayton County, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1290.
249. See, e.g., Brannum v. Overton County Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 499-500 (6th
Cir. 2008); H.Y. ex rel. K.Y. v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1174,
1189-90 (M.D. Ala. 2007); Watkins v. Millennium Sch., 290 F. Supp. 2d 890, 903
(S.D. Ohio 2003); Konop v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 1189, 1203-04 (D. S.D.
1998).
250. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2933, 2646
(2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 2645 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
252. Id. at 2646 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Wil-
son's treatment of Redding was abusive and it was not reasonable for him to believe
that the law permitted it.").
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mas, in a dissent, complained that the majority opinion has imposed a "vague
and amorphous standard on school administrators." 253
IV. PROPOSALS TO REDRESS THE CONTINUING FOURTH
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS IN SCHOOLS
Because the Safford Court failed to effectively clarify existing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in school strip searches, students remain suscepti-
ble to unreasonable searches and seizures on school grounds. However, low-
er courts, state governments, and local school boards can implement specific
laws and policies to ensure that the law is clear so that school officials will
not be shielded from liability in the future. Federal, state, and local govern-
ments should redress the shortcomings of the Safford opinion by banning
strip searches altogether or at least requiring probable cause to justify a strip
search at its inception. Additionally, courts and school boards should further
clarify the scope of the search prong and craft policies to ensure that school
officials have clear guidelines on the issue of imminent danger and location
of the search. School boards should also craft other helpful policies to ensure
that the least intrusive measures possible are used when searching students in
schools.
A. Prong One: Justified at Its Inception
Although Safford refused to ban strip searches in schools or to require
probable cause in all such cases, states can provide their citizens with more
protections than those found in the United States Constitution. In fact, the
Court in TL.O. specifically suggested that New Jersey might choose to pro-
vide greater protection to its citizens under its own constitution or by crafting
legislation.
253. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas recommended that the Court
should have found no Fourth Amendment violation and instead called for a reversion
to the rule of in loco parentis, giving school officials almost complete discretion and
absolute immunity over the discipline of its students, claiming "[pireservation of
order, discipline, and safety in public schools is simply not the domain of the Consti-
tution. And, common sense is not a judicial monopoly or a Constitutional impera-
tive." Id.
254. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 n.10 (1985) ("Of course, New
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1. Ban Strip Searches or Require Probable Cause
States should ban school strip searches altogether. Many states have al-
ready passed legislation that bans strip searches in schools, including New
Jersey,t California,256 Iowa, 25 Oklahoma,258 South Carolina,259 and Wash-
ington.260 Wisconsin has gone even further and made it a criminal act.261
Other states should follow suit and write legislation that protects students by
banning strip searches in schools. If states have no such legislation, local
school boards should consider writing policies that absolutely ban strip
searches in schools. Some school boards have already done so. For example,
the New York City Department of Education specifically prohibits strip
searches of students under all circumstances.262 In the alternative, state legis-
latures, state courts, or local school boards could prohibit strip searches ab-
sent probable cause. 263 Florida, for example, already permits strip searches
only where there is probable cause in law enforcement situations.
2. Define the Term "Strip Search"
If a jurisdiction requires probable cause to justify strip searches or bans
them altogether, it must also define the term "strip search." Some states have
already done so through state legislation. For example, Wisconsin's statute
defines a strip search as "a search in which a detained person's genitals, pubic
255. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-6.1 (West 1999).
256. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49050 (West 2009). California does not specifically use
the term "strip search" but prohibits a search that involves: "(a) Conducting a body
cavity search of a pupil manually or with an instrument; (b) Removing or arranging
any or all of the clothing of a pupil to permit a visual inspection of the underclothing,
breast, buttocks, or genitalia of the pupil." Id.
257. IOWA CODE § 808A.2(4)(a)&(b) (2010).
258. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-102 (2010). Oklahoma's statute specifically prohi-
bits a broadly defined "strip search": "No student's clothing, except cold weather
outerwear, shall be removed prior to or during the conduct of any warrantless search."
Id.
259. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-1140 (2009).
260. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.230(3) (2010).
261. Wis. STAT. § 948.50(3) (2010).
262. See New York City Dept. of Educ., Reg. No. A-432, p. 2 (2005), available at
http://docs.nycenet.docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-2 I /A-432.pdf.
263. The probable cause standard has been thoroughly discussed in other cases
and considers not only the reasonable suspicion but also the reliability of the know-
ledge of suspicion. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113 (1983); Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418-19
(1969).
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area, buttock or anus, or a female person's breast, is uncovered and either is
exposed to view or is touched by a person conducting the search."265 Okla-
homa's statute defines a strip search much more broadly to include the re-
moval of a "student's clothing, except cold weather outerwear."266 Many
state legislatures have already defined the term str search to include situa-
tions where underwear need not be fully removed.26
In addition to definitions imposed by state legislatures, some courts have
defined the term strip search. For example, the First Circuit defined a strip
search as "an inspection of a naked individual, without any scrutiny of the
subject's body cavities." 268 The Seventh Circuit defined a strip search in
inmate situations as "a visual inspection of a naked inmate without intrusion
into the person's body cavities." The Supreme Court in Safford, although
unwilling to define the term strip search, was willing to admit that the pulling
of Redding's underwear away from her body could be considered a strip
search.270
Only a handful of states have banned strip searches and defined the
term. Other states should follow suit. If states choose not to ban strip
searches or define the term, they should require a school official to have
probable cause before asking students to remove their clothing in school. If
these changes are implemented at the state or local level, jurisdictions can
provide more protections to the citizens than the current federal Constitution-
al law as interpreted by T.L. 0. and Safford.
265. Wis. STAT. § 948.50(2)(b).
266. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-102 (2010).
267. Compare CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49050 (strip search included "[r]emoving or
arranging any or all of the clothing of a pupil to permit a visual inspection of the un-
derclothing, breast, buttocks, or genitalia of the pupil"), and Wis. STAT. §
948.50(2)(b) (strip search is one in which "a person's genitals, pubic area, buttock or
anus, or a female person's breast, is uncovered and either is exposed to view or is
touched by a person conducting the search"), with OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-102 ("No
student's clothing, except cold weather outerwear, shall be removed prior to or during
the conduct of any warrantless search.").
268. Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 561 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Savard v.
Rhode Island, 338 F.3d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 2003) (en banc) (defining strip searches as
"visual inspections of the naked body"); Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 108
n.1 (1st Cir. 2001) ("A 'strip search' involves a visual inspection of the naked body of
an inmate.").
269. Peckham v. Wisc. Dep't of Corr., 141 F.3d 694, 695 (7th Cir. 1998).
270. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009)
("The exact label for this final step in the intrusion is not important, though strip
search is a fair way to speak of it.").
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B. Prong Two: Scope of the Search
Even in states where the first prong of the TL.O. test remains intact
(those states that do not require probable cause at the inception or ban such
strip searches outright), state courts and local school boards should permit
strip searches only in a location where the officials have probable cause that
the student is hiding the contraband and only in instances where there is an
immediate danger to the students. Because age and sex do not provide any
helpful guidance to courts, they should not be factors in the analysis of
271scope.
1. The Location of the Search and Individualized Suspicion
Lower courts should mandate that school officials be permitted to search
a location only where they have probable cause that the items ma y be found.
Although the Safford Court only required reasonable suspicion, this loca-
tion condition should be explicitly mandated by lower courts in all strip
search cases, and the level of scrutiny should be raised to the higher standard
of probable cause. Once implemented, this requirement should help cure
situations where strip searches occur in schools without individualized suspi-
cion. With a location requirement, an official would not be able to strip
search all students of a fifth-grade class for missing contraband. Instead, he
would only be able to strip search a particular student if he has probable cause
that the item in question would be found under that student's clothing. Thus,
searching a group of students without individualized suspicion would no
longer be permitted.
2. The Immediate Threat of Danger
In addition to mandating a location requirement, lower courts should
mandate that school officials be permitted to resort to a strip search only
when there is an immediate threat to the health and safety of the school, such
as weapons or drugs. The Safford decision stated that one of the fatal defi-
ciencies of the search for the prescription-strength ibuprofen was the lack of
"any indication of danger to the students."273 Lower courts should do the
same and permit strip searches only when there is immediate danger to stu-
dents.
271. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
272. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2643.
273. Id. at 2642-43; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Sup-
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Determining when students are in immediate danger is a more difficult
question in light of the confusing dicta from Safford. While T.L.O. mandated
that courts should not second-guess school officials when determining the
nature of the intrusion, 274 the Safford opinion rejected this mandate and trivia-
275lized the officials' concerns about nonprescription medication. To rectify
this inconsistency, lower courts should only be able to second-guess school
policies when there are no written school policies available to the community.
If there are no such written policies, the courts may apply their own judgment
regarding imminent risk to students.
School boards are best suited to write and implement specific policies
regarding student strip searches at a local level. Currently, all states except
Hawaii have delegated day-to-day management of school systems to their
school boards.276 Board members are elected to their positions, and they de-
277
velop and implement educational policies throughout their system. School
boards should dictate through written policy what situations create imminent
danger in the school system, such as the possession of weapons, illegal drugs,
or prescription-strength ibuprofen.
If the policies are written by the school board and approved by the par-
ents in the community, the courts should not be able to substitute their judi-
cial opinion in place of the policy. The Sixth Circuit, in denying qualified
immunity in Brannum, admonished the school officials for failing to institute
policies designed to protect the privacy of the students, such as by advising
278the students or their parents that the students were being videotaped. If the
school board had notified the parents with clearly written policies, the court
would not have had to speculate as to the school's motives and priorities.
Written policies provide notice to courts, school officials, parents, and
students regarding the types of situations that would warrant strip searches in
a school. If the policies are not acceptable to parents and students, they can
work with the school board to make modifications. Because school board
members are elected officials, parents retain some control over the policies
implemented in the school district. Community involvement would help edu-
cate both the school officials and the parents in understanding and shaping the
students' rights within the school systems. Thus, strip searches for small
sums of money could not be justified without a written policy stating that
petty thefts create an imminent risk or danger to the students and thus warrant
strip searches; such a policy would most likely not be acceptable to parents in
the community. As a result, Justice Stevens' concern in his dissent in
274. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42.
275. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2642-43. Contra id. at 2652, 2654 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting).
276. Scott A. Gartner, Strip Searches of Students: What Johnny Really Learned at
School and How Local School Boards Can Help Solve the Problem, 70 S. CAL. L.
REv. 921, 964 (1997).
277. Id.
278. Brannum v. Overton County Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 497 (6th Cir. 2008).
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T.L.O.279 would be mitigated because school officials would be hard-pressed
to explicitly identify the theft of ten dollars, a dress code violation, or a chew-
ing gum violation as one that would create a danger to the community.280
Thus, courts should not second-guess written policies in place within a
school system. School boards and communities should promulgate and moni-
tor policies that fairly protect both the educational and safety commitments of
teachers and students' rights.
3. Other Helpful Policies
School boards that choose not to ban strip searches outright should pre-
scribe the manner in which strip searches can be performed, such as requiring
that they be performed in the least intrusive way possible.281 Some jurisdic-
tions have already created such policies.282 For example, in H. Y ex rel. K. Y.
v. Russell County Board ofEducation, the school district had clear policies in
its handbook.283 The first policy addressed general searches of students, stat-
ing that "officials 'when possible should avoid frequent and unnecessary
group searches."' 284 According to the policy, group searches are only justi-
fied
(1) when there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of
"illegal or dangerous activities" will be found; (2) when the search
is justified by the "immediacy of the circumstances" and the "need
to protect the safety and welfare of students;" and (3) "when the
invasiveness of the search method employed is minimal."285
The handbook then discussed strip searches, concluding that if a more
intrusive search is needed, the officials "shall call the parents of the students
involved and report their suspicions to the police who shall be responsible for
any such searches." 286
279. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 385-86 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
280. If school boards did identify a dress code violation as a danger to the com-
munity, the parents could change the policy by pressuring school boards.
281. For example, in Watkins v. Millennium School, the school system had a poli-
cy that stated, "[T]he search of a Student's person or intimate personal belongings
shall be conducted by the Chief Executive Officer. This person should be of the Stu-
dent's gender and conduct the search in the presence of another staff member of the
same gender." 290 F. Supp. 2d 890, 894-95 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
282. See H.Y. ex rel. K.Y. v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1174,
1182 (M.D. Ala. 2007); Watkins, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 894-95.
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In promulgating such written policies, school boards can protect both
the teachers and the students. First, school officials would have clear guide-
lines regarding the permissibility of strip searches and the parameters for such
searches. The T.L.O. Court wanted to "spare teachers and school administra-
tors the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable
cause."287 By providing clear rules directly to the school officials, school
boards can educate the officials. School officials are much more likely to
read these guidelines promulgated by their school boards than to research,
read, and understand the nuances of T.L.O., Safford, and other conflicting
cases to understand the rules on strip searching within a particular school
district. School boards can also create training programs for the school offi-
cials within their respective systems. That mechanism can educate the teach-
ers, nurses, and administrative officials as to when a strip search is warranted
and how to perform one within both constitutional and local limits. By pro-
viding clear guidelines, schools can avoid expensive litigation and protect
school officials from liability.
Second, written policies will help protect students from an abuse of dis-
cretion by school officials. For example, in Watkins v. Millennium School,
the school had a policy that the school's chief executive officer perform any
search of a student.288 The court refused to grant qualified immunity when a
teacher searched third-grade students because the school's policy put her on
notice that she was not permitted to perform the search.289 The Watkins court
cautioned that noncompliance with policies subjected students to the teach-
er's sole discretion, which is exactly what T.L.O. sought to avoid.290 Like-
wise, the court in H. Y. specifically mentioned the policy against group
searches, although it did not specifically state it was relying on that policy,
when it denied the defense of qualified immunity.291 Similar policies can
help both parents and school officials determine and understand what is ap-
propriate within the school district and protect students from the abuse of
discretion by teachers and administrators.
287. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985).
288. 290 F. Supp. 2d 890, 894-95 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
289. Id. at 903.
290. Id. at 901.
291. H. Y, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 1189-90.
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V. CONCLUSION
Savana Redding was subjected to an intrusive, traumatic invasion of her
privacy at her own school when she was forced to expose her body simply
because the school principal had a hunch that she might be hiding prescrip-
tion-strength ibuprofen in her underwear. Despite the Supreme Court's find-
ing of a Fourth Amendment violation, the principal was shielded by the doc-
292trine of qualified immunity because the law was unclear.
Well before Savana Reddin 's unfortunate experience, the Supreme
Court, in New Jersey v. TL.O., established the law of searches within
schools. Although the T.L.O. Court held that students should be afforded
their Fourth Amendment rights,294 twenty-five years of confusing and mud-
dled case law has diluted those rights so they are almost nonexistent.295
The Safford case presented the Supreme Court with the perfect opportu-
nity to rectify the problems resulting from the ambiguous law created by
T.L.O. and its progeny of strip search cases. Unfortunately, the Court failed
to adequately protect students' Fourth Amendment rights. First, the Court
refused to modify the TL.O. standard so that strip searches in schools have a
higher level of scrutiny than a search of a purse. Instead, the Court applied a
mercurial sliding scale test that has led and will lead to more confusion and
complications in applying the law. Second, the Court, in making some clari-
fications within the second prong of the T.L.O. test, created more ambiguity
than clarity and did not go far enough to protect students from school offi-
cials' discretion. To add insult to injury, instead of clarifying the law, the
Safford Court illustrated the ongoing ambiguity by shielding the school offi-
cial from liability because the law on the issue was unclear.
Although schools in the United States tend to publicly promote learning
through a safe, supportive, nurturing, and positive environment,296 students
292. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643-44
(2009).
293. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
294. Id. at 333.
295. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
296. See, e.g., Safford United School District Beliefs, http://www.saffordusd.
kl 2.az.us/exec/eSitelnfo.asp?set site to-RAC&division=RAC:+Home&groupis=&i
d=40 (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (promoting positive school climate); Safford United
School District Mission Statement, http://www.saffordusd.kl2.az.us/exec/eSiteinfo.
asp?set site to=RAC&division=RAC:+Home&group is=&id=39 (last visited Sept.
10, 2010) (promoting respect for others); Edison Public School District,
http://www.edisonpublicschools.org/Board%20of/20Education/BoardofEducationM
embers.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (mission statement promoting safe and sup-
portive learning environment); Burning Tree Elementary School - About Our School,
http://www.montgomeryschoolsmd.org/schools/burningtreees/about/ (last visited
Sept. 10, 2010) (mission statement promoting safe, nurturing environment).
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will feel vulnerable in their learning environments because school administra-
tors can continue to violate their Fourth Amendment rights and hide behind
the doctrine of qualified immunity. To redress this crisis in our school sys-
tem, state and local governments will need to address the Safford deficiencies
and protect students at the local level. First, state and local government
should require probable cause for strip searches or ban them altogether. At
the very least, they should define the term strip search so that all interested
parties know when one has occurred. Second, courts and local school boards
should prohibit strip searches unless there is imminent danger to students and
then permit such searches only when there is probable cause that the contra-
band is hidden under an individual student's clothing. Local school boards
can promulgate policies that protect both the students and the teachers. In
addition, school boards can educate teachers, parents, and students so that all
parties are on notice and the community can work together to create a safe
educational environment for students.
Once these explicit cures, clarifications, and policies are in place, school
officials will not be able to hide behind the doctrine of qualified immunity
when they violate students' Fourth Amendment rights. Only then will stu-
dents feel adequately protected from Fourth Amendment violations within
their schools. Schools that truly promote learning in a safe environment
should take the lead in implementing these changes rather than strip searching
the very students they claim to protect.
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